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Abstract
Financial markets are different today from what they were two decades ago. This
thesis examines recent issues in modern market structure: algorithmic liquidity
provision, competition among exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and the shift of
trading to the close of the trading day. The findings enhance our understand-
ing of market structure changes resulting from technology, product innovation
and market fragmentation.
Chapter 2 of this thesis examines how liquidity provision in fragmented markets
affects order-to-trade ratios (OTTRs), a metric used by regulators to detect ex-
cessive quoting activity and market misconduct. The theoretical OTTR is deter-
mined by the trade-off between the market maker’s information monitoring costs
and picking-off risk (trading at stale prices). The theory explains why high OT-
TRs can result from legitimate market making in fragmented markets and are not
necessarily a sign of misconduct. The empirical analysis supports the theoretical
predictions. The empirical results suggest that recent growth in OTTRs is driven
largely by fragmentation of trading across multiple venues and decreasing moni-
toring costs due to technological improvements. Calibration reveals that OTTRs
on a typical day are within levels that are consistent with market-making activity,
but occasionally spike beyond such levels. The results imply that regulatory mea-
sures designed to curb OTTRs (e.g., messaging taxes) are likely to harm liquidity
provision in fragmented markets and create a non-level playing field for trading
venues.
iv
Chapter 3 asks how ETFs compete with one another and how their secondary mar-
ket liquidity shapes this competition. It is puzzling that high-fee ETFs not only
survive, but often accumulate greater assets under management (AUM), compared
to low-fee ETFs tracking the same index. This chapter develops the equilibrium
model of ETF competition, which resolves this puzzle. The main insight from the
model is that secondary market liquidity of an ETF plays a key role in determining
ETF fees and leads to liquidity clienteles. Greater liquidity attracts high-turnover
investors, which sustain the high liquidity in a self-perpetuating cycle. The liq-
uidity advantage allows the high-fee ETF to charge higher fees. The low-fee ETF
serves low-turnover clientele, who are more sensitive to fees rather than liquidity.
Liquidity clienteles explain the key features of ETF competition, including the
first-mover advantage, the “winner-take-all” dynamics in trading volumes and the
ability for incumbent ETFs to maintain higher fees. Empirical tests confirm the
important role of liquidity clienteles and show that fee differentials for otherwise
similar ETFs provide a novel measure of the value of liquidity to investors. Wel-
fare analysis suggests that liquidity can be a source of monopolistic rents for ETF
issuers.
Chapter 4 makes a methodological contribution by developing new measures of
price discovery for sequential markets. The methodology accounts for the pres-
ence of noise in market prices, and hence allows us to study a new array of issues in
modern market structure. Price discovery (the incorporation of new information
into a security’s price) is typically measured when a security trades simultane-
ously in multiple markets. The method proposed in this thesis extends the classic
price discovery model of Hasbrouck (1995) to settings in which a security trades
in consecutive phases (e.g., different market mechanisms or time zones) rather
than in multiple markets. This approach allows information (efficient price inno-
vations) to be separated from noise (microstructure frictions and liquidity) in each
consecutive phase of trading. The Monte Carlo simulations confirm that the em-
pirical estimation recovers correct Information Shares (IS), Noise Shares (NS), and
Information-to-Noise ratios (IN). The method is computationally convenient, as it
relies only on the output from vector autoregressive models (VARs). The proposed
framework accounts for microstructure frictions in prices, and therefore produces
more precise estimates of price informativeness compared to existing approaches.
v
Chapter 5 asks why so much trading has shifted towards the close of the trading
day, and whether this tendency has made closing prices more informative. The
empirical analysis shows that index investing, including ETFs, is by far the most
important driver of trading on close. The price discovery results suggest that
closing price informativeness has not improved with greater trading on close. The
estimates rely on the novel price discovery methodology developed in the Chapter
4. The results reinforce policymakers’ concerns that the increase in trading on
close makes closing prices more vulnerable to dislocations.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the academic and industry debate on the
optimal market structure. The analysis of market-making OTTRs suggests that
regulators should strike a balance between discouraging excessive quoting activity
and encouraging competition between exchanges. The findings from ETF liq-
uidity analysis imply that liquidity can be seen as a public good, with resulting
“winner-take-all” externalities. The investigation of trading on close suggests that
both market participants and regulators should recognize the potential disconnect
between concentrated trading and price discovery. Although trading increasingly
concentrates on close, price discovery still happens in continuous limit order books.
vi
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